In the previous post, I introduced readers to the tale of Lieutenant
Henry Prince, an officer from the 4th U.S. Infantry, who, in
February 1836, marched with the column that discovered the remains of the
infamous Dade Massacre. Today, I’m going to talk about Prince’s
Civil War experience. In this tale, the fifty-two-year-old general marched at the head of a far less
successful column, the failure of which resulted in his removal from the Army
of the Potomac and the tarnishing of his long, illustrious career.
In general, Prince did not have a fun time in the Civil War, serving in
combat rarely and often bearing the stigma of being too slow-moving and
methodical. His Civil War days began on April 20, 1862, when the War Department
decided to raise him to the rank of brigadier general and assigned him to command
a brigade attached to Major General Nathaniel Banks’s corps. On August 9,
1862, at Prince’s first battle, Confederate troops captured him. Just as the
sun set at Cedar Mountain, Prince was walking his horse through a smoky
cornfield, unaware that hundreds of soldiers belonging to the 23rd
Virginia were moving through the stalks, encircling him. They leveled their
muskets, and thus, Prince spent five unhappy months at Libby Prison.
The War Department did its duty, negotiating Prince’s parole and exchange,
but upon his return to service, he didn’t last long in the field. He first rejoined
Union forces in the tidewater, but had to request medical leave in
April 1863. Later that summer, Prince returned to service yet again, transferring
to the Army of the Potomac. On July 8, only a few days after the Battle of
Gettysburg, Major General Andrew A. Humphreys, commander of the 2nd
Division, 3rd Corps, became the Army of the Potomac’s
chief-of-staff. Two days later, on July 10, the War Department appointed
Prince as Humphreys’s replacement. On July 23, Prince led the 2nd Division
against Confederate forces at Wapping Heights, a battle in which he exhibited
noticeable caution.
However, the unfortunate event that called everyone’s attention to Prince’s
conservative approach to combat occurred a few months later during the Mine Run
Campaign. Prince’s corps commander, Major General William H. French, assigned him
a critical role by putting him in at the head of the Union foray across the Rapidan
River. This movement formed part of Major General George G. Meade’s grand plan
to put the Army of the Potomac across the Rapidan at two places, Jacobs’s
Ford and Germanna Ford. Major General Gouvernor K. Warren’s 2nd Corps
was supposed to lead the way across the latter and then advance west along the
Orange Turnpike, holding the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia in place.
Meanwhile, Major General French’s 3rd Corps was supposed to cross at
Jacobs’s Ford and hit the Confederate line from the north. Nothing went as
planned. Prince’s division, which led the 3rd Corps to Jacob’s Ford,
failed to cross in a timely manner, and even when it did, it failed to navigate
its way through the woods and rendezvous with the 2nd Corps at
Robertson’s Tavern. Much of the delay and poor navigation stemmed from Prince’s
lackluster leadership.
Here’s how it happened. On November 26, 1863, the day of the operation,
Prince received orders to lead the 3rd Corps to the ford. General
French had left detailed instructions about when to proceed, how to cross
the river, and which roads to take to reach Robertson’s Tavern. For whatever
reason, Prince failed to heed his superior’s advice. The march was supposed to
begin at 5:20, but by 7:45, the 2nd Division had advanced only one
mile beyond its starting point. What caused this slow movement? First, Prince could
not be found by the 3rd Corps staff officers. Although Prince had
carried out the prepatory order (the order to get his men ready to march), he did not receive his execution order until
an hour after the planned start time. Second, when he finally received it, Prince
moved too slowly. He received the order to advance at 6:30,
but his column did not set out until 7:30. The delay infuriated General French,
who wondered why the column was stuck on the road. Days later, after French
had conducted an investigation of the problem, he laid the blame on Prince,
by writing, “By this it will be seen . . . that although he [Prince] received the
prepatory order in due time, he lost an hour from the time he received the
order of execution, for which loss he has assigned no reason.”
Then, once the head of Prince’s column reached the ford, it did not
cross quickly. His men encountered Confederate scouts, causing Prince to halt the
column and deploy skirmishers. After his infantry cleared the banks, Prince
ordered them to move off the road and make way for the engineers who planned to lay
pontoons. More time passed, since Prince had taken no precaution to have the
pontoons readily available. The 3rd Corps did not get across the
Rapidan River until 4:00 P.M. The rest of the corps completed the crossing by
7:00 P.M., a whole day wasted.
From there, the situation only got worse. The next morning, November
27, Prince’s 2nd Division followed the road from the ford south, but had to
pause at a place where the road split. The right fork headed back to the
river near the Sisson Farm, the left fork headed south to the Morton’s Ford
Road. Unaware that he might have to navigate his way through several confusing road
intersections, Prince halted his command, sending a message back to
headquarters that he now needed guide. Meanwhile, he deployed several
regiments as skirmishers, sending them down each fork, hoping they might bring
back proper intelligence. As Prince explained later: “Being in command of the
advance, and having no guide, I conceived it to be my duty to exert my judgment
as to the route, and by reconnoitering to clear up the way if I could. This I
succeeded in doing by always holding the forks of roads which I came to, and
reconnoitering away from them, always reconnoitering with the most strength
toward the enemy.”
After due deliberation, Prince led his column down the left-hand fork.
Coming upon a second fork, it became clear he had taken the wrong road. The
column should have gone right, through the Sisson property, where it could have
met a route to the Raccoon Ford Road, the most direct way to the tavern. Now lost, Prince paused his
column yet again, holding it still for another two hours, reconnoitering both
forks. As Prince’s men mingled amid the forest known as the Wilderness, they
could hear the sound of Warren’s 2nd Corps fighting near Robertson’s
Tavern. Clearly, the 3rd Corps had missed its important rendezvous.
A disgruntled New Jersey officer assigned to Prince’s division later wrote, “A
good deal of amusement arose from the fact that Genl. Prince became lost. Some
say that ‘Prince of the House of David was lost with his children and wandered
about the Wilderness.’ It was a hard sorry time for us.”
As the sun neared its zenith, General French finally became concerned with
the sluggishness of the 3rd Corps’ forward movement. He sent a staff
officer to Prince with an inquiry: “The general orders that you move on by the
Robertson’s Tavern road [meaning the road that connected Robertson’s Tavern to
Raccoon Ford], and he wants to know what you are going to do.” Apparently
confused as to where he was and which road French meant, and lacking a better
response, Prince replied, “I shall first take the road, and having obtained
possession of it, shall reconnoiter and act according to circumstances.”
By late-morning, the column finally got underway, heading in the right
direction. It back-tracked to the Jacobs’s Ford Road and began moving south. Sadly,
the delay was fatal to Union success. A Confederate division under Major General
Edward Johnson had already moved south along the Raccoon Ford Road, alarmed at
the sound of the fighting started by Warren’s 2nd Corps. As it moved
to the sound of the guns, it drifted into the path of Prince’s oncoming
federals. At the intersection of the Jacob’s Ford Road and the Raccoon Ford
Road, Prince’s two leading brigades slammed into the tail end of Johnson’s
column, and a fight developed on the land owned by Madison Payne. It took hours
for French to bring up the next division and come to the aid of Prince’s
embattled troops. Three hours later, both sides had racked up 1,400 casualties,
and neither army had driven the other from the field. Although Meade assembled
his command and probed the Confederate line over the next three days, his best
chance at hammering Lee’s army may have lapsed on November 27.
The aftermath of the dismal battle spelled an end to Prince’s career with the
Army of the Potomac. General Warren wanted to know why the 3rd Corps
had hung him out to dry, and General French—who himself was on the hot seat for
accusations of being drunk at the battle—cast all the blame on his elderly
division commander. In French’s mind, Prince’s tardiness had caused the
debacle. French wrote: “In connection with his [Prince’s] habitual slowness of
movement, as exhibited in his preparation for crossing the ford, and the want
of a guide after crossing the ford to conduct the column upon the route which
was subsequently followed, . . . are the causes to which are attributable the
inability of the Third Corps to arrive at Robertson’s Tavern sooner than it
did.”
When the Army of the Potomac downsized its command structure in the
spring of 1864, it deleted several billets, including French’s and Prince’s. The
crime of getting lost in the woods was bad enough, apparently, to keep Prince from
ever seeing combat again.
This photograph depicts Brig. Gen. Prince in the late summer of 1863. He is surrounded by the staff of the 2nd Division, 3rd Corps.
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This is Maj. Gen. William H. French, the commander of the 3rd Corps, the superior officer who insisted that Prince botched the march from Jacobs's Ford to Payne's Farm.
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